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Kass states (page 5) that Figure 3 is not a good
general description of statistical inference and that
Figure 1 is more accurate. I completely agree. Kass
states (page 5) that “It is important for students in
introductory courses to see the subject as a coherent,
principled, whole.” I completely agree. Since Figure
3 represents the framework within which statistics
is usually taught, at all levels, we have a serious
problem. These issues have bothered me deeply for
a long time. This important paper forcibly brings
these matters to light and I hope it is influential.
Figure 3 represents “sampling from a finite popu-
lation.” There are a large number of unknown num-
bers and we randomly pick some of them to uncover.
The “population quantities” are summaries of all
of the numbers. These are the parameters. Sample
quantities are summaries of the uncovered numbers.
All “randomness” arises from that which we inject
by randomly picking the sample. This is so obviously
not a description of what we usually do in statisti-
cal modeling that I am just amazed at its persis-
tence. “Randomness” comes from my personal need
to make a decision in an uncertain context (Lindley,
1985).
As Kass does, let me take a “simple” example.
I just taught an introductory statistics class. How
did the need for “probabilistic thinking” come into
the course in a way that the students could im-
mediately see the need for it? The practical prob-
lem of choosing an investment portfolio for one pe-
riod was considered. You could put your money in
a riskless asset (government bonds) with known re-
turn or a risky asset (the market). Past data on
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market returns are available. Several issues need to
be discussed. There is not really anything such as
a “riskless asset” but compared to stocks, gover-
ments bonds are riskless. There is a useful, but im-
perfect match between our model and the real world.
How much do the past returns guide us representing
our uncertainty about the unknown future return?
Suppose you hold the portfolio for two periods. Is
the return in the second period related to (indepen-
dent of) the return in the first? How could returns
be approximately independent? Perhaps the theory
of efficient markets sheds light on this. That is how I
introduced probability and (I think) I got away with
it. I used a normal distribution to describe my uncer-
tainty about the next return. I graphically showed
that my choice of mean and variance was “somewhat
consistent” with the past but emphasized that I did
not have to match the past and we discussed devia-
tions that one might want to consider. I would say
that my approach was largely consistent with Kass’
Figure 1. I would also say that the idea of a ran-
dom sample from a finite (or infinite) population
was nowhere to be seen.
Figures 1 (and 4) are not easy ideas. But not ad-
dressing them directly just makes it more confusing
in the long run. What you really need in a good
course are relatively simple examples which are en-
tirely in the spirit of Figures 1 and 4. I did use coins
and dice in discussing the intuitive idea of indepen-
dence. However, I also emphasize that saying returns
are independent is a big assumption with serious
consequences.
In more complex statistical modeling where we
consider many variables, many basic statistical is-
sues must be considered. Ones of general importance
that come to mind are the bias–variance trade-off
in prediction and the difference between prediction
given passive observations of a system versus predic-
tions about the effect of an intervention in a system
that has not been done before (correlation versus
causation). These kinds of issues fit naturally into
Figures 1 and 4. I assume that the term “conclu-
sions” is meant to include predictions.
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Of course, the other issue that statistical science
stresses is the quantification of our uncertainty about
our conclusions. Here, I still believe the Bayesian ap-
proach has real advantages. Kass knows all the argu-
ments better than I do so I will not go through the
list but I cannot resist rattling off a few. Even teach-
ing an introductory course, the severe deficiencies
of classically inspired approaches become apparent.
I could not see a huge difference between the fre-
quentist and pragmatic attitudes in Section 3. We
all know that most people treat confidence inter-
vals as probability intervals, which is not too bad
since they often are reasonable approximations. In
the testing area, it is well documented that serious
power calculations are scant. If you just report a p-
value, have you learned anything? It is just a draw
from the uniform under the null. To compute the
power you need to pick places under the alternative
which requires—a prior!
But, perhaps a more fundamental argument for
the Bayesian perspective is that it helps us think the
way Figures 1 and 4 tell us to. I know you can un-
derstand causality and bias–variance trade-off and
maybe all the key modeling ideas with frequentist
reasoning but I still feel that thinking about prob-
ability subjectively makes it easier to think about
modeling. In this regard, some of my all-time fa-
vorites are Chapters 1 and 2 of Cowell et al. (2007).
It is just a lot easier for me to think about next
period’s return as my beliefs or “some reasonable
person’s” beliefs than some repeated imaginary se-
quence contingent upon some unknown “true” state
of nature. I think about independence by asking my-
self if one thing could help me guess another. I think
about conditional independence by asking myself if
I knew something else, then would the one thing help
me guess the other. I make up things that do not ex-
ist (parameters) in order to build a story about how
things are related. I just think this is a more realis-
tic way to think along the lines of Figures 1 and 4.
I do not know what the term “random sample” in
the “pragmatic interpretation” on page 4 means in
most of the examples I work.
Maybe I have been trying to think like a Bayesian
for a number of years and have found a few examples
where I think it works. I have certainly also found a
few examples where I have tried to construct a useful
prior in a high-dimensional space and failed. I think I
do use the subjective interpretation of probability in
practice. I say, “Maybe not me if I had lots of time to
think about it, but a reasonable person could believe
all this and if I compute a conditional for him then
he would believe that.” Of course if the probability
intervals for things we care about consistently fail
to “cover” we may want to rethink all important
aspects of our model.
Death to Figure 3.
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